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STATEti.~ENT OF THE CA.Sf=
This case is currently before the Idaho Court of Appeals on appeal from
the district court's intermediate appellate decision that the magistrate erred by
concluding that a "no hunting" sign did not give notice to Long that by hunting on
the posted private property he was trespassing.

This brief is submitted in

response to this Court's Order for Supplemental Briefing (hereinafter "Order").
The Order states: "the parties are instructed to address the effect of the
magistrate's grant of judgment of acquittal to the instant appeal, in light of the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision regarding double jeopardy rendered in State v.
Howard, 150 Idaho 471,248 P.3d 722 (2011)." Review of applicable law shows

that, although it appears that Long cannot be retried, any claim that double
jeopardy bars the appeal was waived.

In addition, if this Court reaches the

merits despite the waiver, application of the relevant law shows no bar to the
appeal.

"'

iSSUES
The state submits that the issues raised by this Court's Order are as
follows:
1.

The appellate courts of Idaho will not address issues not raised at every
step of the legal proceedings, including intermediate appeals to the district
court. In addition, Idaho appellate courts will not reach issues not raised
pursuant to the applicable rules in the appellant's brief. Here Long did not
raise double jeopardy at any stage of the proceedings, including in the
briefing to this Court. Is this Court prohibited by well established legal
principles -from reaching the merits of this clearly waived issue?

2.

Even if the question of double jeopardy is reached, is the law established
that double jeopardy bars only a re-trial where there has been an acquittal
but does not prohibit an appeal by the government?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Long Has Vvaived Any Argument That Double Jeopardy Bars This Appeal
"On an appeal from the district court sitting as an intermediate appellate
court, this Court will not consider issues that were not raised before the district
court even if those issues had been raised in the magistrate court." State v. Doe,
144 Idaho 819, 822, 172 P.3d 1094, 1097 (2007).

See also Montgomery v.

Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 10, 205 P.3d 650, 659 (2009) (''This Court will not
address an issue not raised before the district court sitting in its appellate
capacity."); Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731, 737, 963 P.2d 1168,
1174 ( 1998) ("It is well settled that an issue is not preserved for review by this
Court even though it was raised before the magistrate when the issue is not
raised later before the district court in the intermediate appeal.") (quoted in Kraly
v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 304, 208 P.3d 281, 286 (2009)). Long did not assert to
the district court that double jeopardy barred the appeal. (R., pp. 128-36.) His
statement of the issues on appeal to the district court addressed the merits of the
magistrate's order and asserts no claim that double jeopardy bars the appeal.
(R., pp. 130-31.) Long made no mention of double jeopardy in oral arguments to

the district court. (Tr., p. 8, L. 21 - p. 16, L. 15.) The district court ruled on no
double jeopardy issues.

(R., pp. 153-61.)

Because no claim that double

jeopardy barred the state's appeal was made to the district court sitting in its
appellate capacity, it is weil established that this Court will not consider this
issue.
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In addition, it is we:! established
Court, the appellant is required to

order to be c::msidered by this
legal issues and provide authorities

supporting the arguments in the opening brief."

Patterson v. State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, _ , 256 P.3d 718, 729 (2011) (internal
quotations omitted). See also Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d
756, 760 (2005). Failure to list an issue in the issue statement of the appellant's
brief generally waives consideration of an issue, although the rule may be
relaxed where the issue is addressed in the argument section of that brief.
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 180 n.1, 219 P.3d 1192, 1196 n.1 (2009)
(citing I.A.R. 35(a)(4)). "A reviewing court looks to the initial brief on appeal for
the issues presented on appeal." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 557, 130 P.3d
1087, 1095 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). Failure to present an issue in
compliance with the rules results in waiver of that issue.

Idaho Power Co. v.

Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750-51, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216-17 (2000). Long
raised no claim related to double jeopardy in the appellant's brief (Appellant's
brief, pp. 5-18), and therefore waived that issue on appeal.
"Idaho case law requires that the party asserting an issue seek a specific
ruling on that issue at each stage of the appeal." Rammell v. Idaho State Dept.
of Agriculture, 147 Idaho 415, 421, 210 P.3d 523, 529 (2009) (superseded on
other grounds by statute).

Double jeopardy is an issue that may be waived.

See, ~ . I.C.R. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds must be
brought before trial). Here Long has failed to raise double jeopardy as an issue
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any stage

the proceedings.

Double jeopardy ':s therefore not an issue

proper!y addressed on appeal.

11.
If The Merits Of The Double Jeopardy Issue Are Reached Despite Long's
Waiver, Applicable Legal Standards Show That Double Jeopardy Bars Only A
Re-Trial, Not This Appeal
If this Court reaches the implications of double jeopardy in this case
despite Long's double waiver, application of relevant legal standards shows that
this appeal may proceed. This Court's order requires briefing "[s]pecifically" on
the question of "the effect of the magistrate's grant of judgment of acquittal to the

instant appeal, in light of State v. Howard." Order (emphasis added). The Court
of Appeals' concern is apparently language in Howard that double jeopardy may
"bar" appeal of an acquittal. Review of the Howard opinion, however, shows that
it does not stand for the proposition that the state is barred from appealing from a
judgment of acquittal.
First, review of precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States
shows no double jeopardy bar to a governmental appeal from a judgment of
acquittal.

There are three separate guarantees embodied in the Double

Jeopardy clause: protection against (1) a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Illinois v. Vitale,
447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969) (footnotes omitted)); State v. Corb~s, 151 Idaho 368, 256 P .3d 776 (Ct.
App. 2011 ). "[S]ubjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings
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going to

or innocence violates the Doub!e Jeopa:C:y

"

Smith v.

Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (brackets original, quotations and
citation omitted). An appeal, however, is not a second prosecution or a postacquittal fact-finding proceeding. Double jeopardy precedent therefore does not
indicate that a state's appeal from a judgment of acquittal implicates double
jeopardy protections.
The Supreme Court has held that appeals by the government are allowed
if authorized by statute.

United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 318 (1892);

United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 363 (1975), overruled in different part by
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 100-101 (1978). The Court has interpreted
relevant federal statutes to bar appeals from acquittals. For example, in United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 94 (1978), the Court stated that the "Criminal
Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976 ed.), ... makes appealability of a ruling
favorable to the defendant depend upon whether further proceedings upon
reversal would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause." After concluding that
double jeopardy would not bar a retrial of Scott, the Court held "an appeal by the
Government ... is not barred by 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976 ed.)."

~

at 101. That

the federal statute bars governmental appeals of acquittals in federal courts does
not bar such appeals in Idaho's courts, however.
In Idaho the legislature has authorized both parties to a criminal action the
right to appeal "from such judgments and orders of the district court ... as
prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court." I.C. § 19-2801. Those rules, in turn,
authorize an appeal of "[a]ny order or judgment, whenever entered and however
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denorni;;ated

a

1

actlon, provided that fr:is ::irovisio1 shall not

authorize a 1evv1 trial in any case whe;-e the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy would otherwise prevent a second trial." I.AR. 11 (c)(4). There
is no double jeopardy bar to this appeal. The opinion in Howard does not (nor
can it) require a different result than that reached by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The relevant inquiry is not whether the appeal is barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause but rather whether it is statutorily authorized, an issue
never raised.

Double jeopardy does not, by itself, bar a governmental appeal

from an acquittal.
Second, review of the Howard decision in its totality does not lead to the
conclusion that the state may not appeal a judgment of acquittal. In Howard, a
unanimous Court held that admissibility of judgments to prove prior convictions
for enhancement purposes is governed by either the rules of evidence or
applicable statutes, and that the district court erred by requiring that evidence
admissible under the rules of evidence also comply with the statutes. State v.
Howard, 150 Idaho 471, 478, 248 P.3d 722, 729 (2011 ).

The Court then

fragmented badly on the question of whether Howard should be deemed
convicted or acquitted of the felony enhancement. Chief Justice Burdick, author
of the Howard opinion, concluded that Howard had been acquitted outright.

kl at

478-82, 248 P.3d 729-33. Justices Horton and J. Jones concurred, concluding
that because the district court's order was ambiguous, it must be interpreted as
an acquittal.

Id. at 482, 248 P.3d at 733.

Justices Eismann and \l\J. Jones

d:ssented, conduding that the district court had not acauitted but had instead
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convicted on the actual e!ements of the enhancement but the;1 ''ac-:it.1:t:ec'· :n a
non-element. !d. at 482-84, 248 P.3d at 733-35. !t is in the part Jf :he opinie:n
that is apparently Chief Justice Burdick's alone that the language in question
appears.
That language is as follows: "It is established that double jeopardy does
not bar the appeal of an acquittal in cases where a jury first returned a guilty
verdict."

kl

at 481, 248 P.3d at 732. "In a bench trial, there is an analogous

situation wherein double jeopardy does not bar the appeal of an acquittal."

.kt

This language does not ultimately show that the state may not appeal from a
judgment of acquittal.
First, the cases cited in support of these statements do not stand for the
principle that the government is barred from an appeal of a judgment of acquittal
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. To the contrary, the Jenkins case, as shown
above, provides that the government may appeal if enabled by statute .
Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 366-67).

.kt (citing

Compare Jenkins, 420 U.S. at 363 ("this Court

held long ago that the Government cannot bring an appeal in a criminal case
absent an express enabling statute").
Second, it does not appear that the language commanded a majority of
the Court.

Although three justices ultimately held that double jeopardy barred

convicting Howard of the felony enhancement, two of those did so only in
concurrence and on a different ground. In the portion of the opinion where the
language in question appears Chief Justice Burdick is apparent!y writing only for
himse:f and not the Court

3

Third, the
the ability to appeal

does net i,1dk:ate that the Court was denying the state
a judgment of acquittal.

Earlier in the opinion, and

writing for a unanimous Court, the very issue raised by the state on appeal was
addressed on the merits and the trial court was found to have erred. Id. at 47578, 248 P.3d at 726-29.

Later in the same opinion the conclusion is stated,

"Even though the district court erred ... the prohibition against double jeopardy
prevents Howard from being convicted of the felony DUI charge."

~

at 482, 248

P.3d at 733 (emphasis added). Clearly the Court did not conclude that the entire
appeal was barred, else it would have dismissed the appeal and not reached the
merits of the issue raised by the state.
Finally, even if the language used in Howard is deemed to be a statement
of the law, that language is that double jeopardy provides a "bar" to the appeal.
Nothing in Howard indicates that the Court is without jurisdiction. Thus, even if a
defendant may raise a "bar" to a state's appeal from a judgment of acquittal,
nothing excuses Long from not raising that bar before the district court and in his
brief on appeal. Because the "bar" is not jurisdictional, Long waived it by failing
to raise it at any point in the proceedings as established in Part I, above.
The state is asking this Court to do the same thing done in Howard by
deciding the merits of the issues Long has raised on appeal. As stated above,
Long has not requested this Court to rule on what effects, if any, double jeopardy
may have on the outcome of this case. If this Court chooses to reach the issue
of double jeopardy, the state requests a ruling on the merits of the district court's

determination that a "no hunting" sign provides statutory notice that
hunting on the restricted property constitutes a trespass.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
appellate decision.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2012.
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